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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

ELVIS RUIZ, FRANCISCO JAVIER
CASTRO and EDUARDO MARTINEZ.

11 | Plaintiffs,

12 | vs.

13 MAX FERNANDEZ and ANN
14 FERNANDEZ, a marital community;
15 and WESTERN RANGE
ASSOCIATION, a foreign nonprofit
organization,,

16 Defendants.

No. CV-11-3088-RMP

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS MAX AND ANN
FERNANDEZ' AND WESTERN
RANGE ASSOCIATION'S
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs hereby respond to the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction filed by defendants pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(1). (Ct. Rec. 27 and

31). Defendants' motions to dismiss should be denied as without a legal basis,

since this Court has undisputed subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiffs

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
DISMISS- 1**

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1 have asserted federal claims against defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act
2 ("FLSA") and Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)¹,
3 thereby providing the court with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Ct.
4 Rec. 1 ¶ 4). The Court has authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear
5 plaintiffs' related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a). Defendants do
6 not contest either of these bases for jurisdiction. The arguments that defendants do
7 raise in their motion have no basis in established law. Therefore, defendants'
8 motions should be denied.

9 I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

10 This is an action filed by three Chilean sheepherders who were recruited by
11 defendant Western Range Association to work in the United States on a temporary
12 basis pursuant to the H-2A visa program. Plaintiff sheepherders were sent to work
13 at defendant Fernandez' ranch in Centerville, Washington. Under the H-2A
14 program, an agricultural employer may contract with temporary foreign guest
15 workers if it obtains certification from the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") that
16 qualified U.S. workers are not available and that employment of the foreign guest
17 workers will not adversely affect wages or working conditions of similarly situated
18 U.S. workers. Based on defendants' applications for H-2A certification and
19 representations that plaintiffs would be employed as range sheepherders, the DOL

20 ¹ Plaintiffs assert the FLSA claim against defendant WRA only and the TVPRA claim against Defendant Fernandez
21 only.

1 permitted defendants to contract with plaintiffs under terms that included a wage
2 rate specific to sheepherders, \$750 per month regardless of the number of hours
3 worked. (Ct. Rec. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 15, 27-30.)

4 However defendants did not assign plaintiffs to work primarily as range
5 sheepherders. Instead, plaintiffs were put to work as ranch hands on defendant
6 Fernandez' ranch, for which they were legally entitled to substantially higher
7 wages than they were paid. Furthermore, defendant Fernandez treated plaintiffs
8 abusively, threatened them with deportation if they left the boundaries of the ranch
9 without his permission and otherwise restricted plaintiffs' contact with the outside
10 world in violation of the TVPRA. (Ct. Rec. 1 at ¶¶ 42-44, 79-84.)

When considering a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a court must accept “all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. *North County Community Alliance v. Salazar*, 573 F.3d 738, 741 - 742 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs have asserted violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, breach of contract, quantum meruit and violations of state wage laws against defendant WRA, and violations of the federal TVPRA, breach of contract, quantum meruit and violations of state wage law against defendants Fernandez. (See Ct. Rec. 1 ¶ 60-84).

II. ARGUMENT

A. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal and state-law claims.

1 This court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2 §1331 over Plaintiffs' federal TVPRA and FLSA claims and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
3 §1367 over Plaintiffs' state contract and wage claims. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges
4 a federal claim under the TVPRA against defendants Fernandez and a FLSA claim
5 against defendant WRA. Plaintiffs' complaint also asserts related state-law causes
6 of action under Washington wage law and contract law. Since the state claims arise
7 out of the same facts as do the federal claims, the state claims are subject to
8 supplemental jurisdiction under §1367.

9 Defendants do not dispute the Court's jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28
10 U.S.C. §1331 and §1367. Instead, defendants have raised arguments that have no
11 basis in the law and misrepresent plaintiffs' asserted basis for jurisdiction. Given
12 the Court's undisputed jurisdiction pursuant to §1331 and §1367, the arguments
13 advanced in defendants' memorandum fail to establish any valid challenge to
14 jurisdiction. Defendants' main point of attack of the Court's jurisdiction in this
15 case -- that plaintiffs have no basis to remedy defendants' breach of their H-2A
16 contract obligations in *any court* – is unsupported by any authority.

17 **B. Defendants' arguments that state-law contract claims are not
18 available to H-2A workers are baseless.**

- 19 i. H-2A workers may bring state contract claims for breach of
20 the H-2A clearance orders.

21 The Ninth Circuit has held specifically that H-2A contract claims, while not

1 creating independent federal jurisdiction, do give rise to contract claims under state
2 contract law. *Nieto-Santos v. Fletcher Farms*, 743 F.2d 638 at 641, n.5 (9th Cir.
3 1984). Defendants' contentions that breach-of-contract claims for H-2A contracts
4 are precluded by DOL agency remedies or by 8 U.S.C. §1329 (Ct. Rec. 28 at 3 -
5 11) are thus contrary to direct circuit precedent.

6 Defendants' arguments are also entirely unsupported even by persuasive
7 authority, since every court to consider contract claims by H-2A workers has, like
8 *Nieto Santos*, held that H-2A clearance orders are employment contracts that can
9 be enforced in court. See, e.g., *Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms*, 305 F.3d 1228, 1233 n.
10 5 (clearance orders are contracts) and 1246 – 1248 (applying state contract law to
11 the clearance orders' terms) (11th Cir. 2002); *Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley*
12 *Farmers Ass'n*, 765 F.2d 1334, 1342 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035
13 (1986) (holding that the DOL regulations are incorporated into the contracts);
14 *Frederick County Fruit Growers v. McLaughlin*, 703 F.Supp. 1021, 1030 - 1031
15 (D.C.D.C. 1989); *Hernandez v. Two Brothers Farm*, 579 F.Supp.2d 1379, 1383
16 (S.D. Fla 2008); *Perez-Benites v. Candy Brand*, 2011 WL 1978414 at *6 (W.D.
17 Ark. 2011). Defendants have cited no case that has held to the contrary.

18 ii. Federal regulation of H-2A contracts does not preclude
19 workers' enforcement of contract rights; instead, the H-2A
contracts incorporate federal, state, and local regulations.

20 When concluding that H-2A contracts are enforceable under state contract

1 law, courts have necessarily rejected defendants' argument (expressed in Ct. Rec.
2 28 at 3) that the existence of a federal agency enforcement mechanism precludes
3 state-law contract claims. *See Arriaga*, 305 F.3d at 1235 - 1237; *Frederick County*,
4 703 F.Supp. at 1030 - 1031; *Centeno-Bernuy v. Becker Farms*, 564 F.Supp.2d 166,
5 183 - 185 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). Indeed, plaintiffs are not even required to exhaust
6 administrative remedies before filing a contract action. *See Centeno-Bernuy*, 564
7 F.Supp.2d at 184.

8 Defendants suggest that the federal regulatory scheme's relationship to
9 Plaintiffs' contract claims requires the Court to conclude that H-2A workers have
10 no contractual remedies under H-2A contracts, either because they are preempted
11 by the regulatory scheme (Ct. Rec. 28 at 3 – 7) or because H-2A contract claims
12 are "disguised" attempts to bring a private action to enforce a federal statutory
13 scheme (Ct. Rec. 28 at 14), which is, in defendants' view, not allowed under *Cort*
14 *v. Ash*, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). No court has adopted either of those arguments (See
15 cases cited *supra*.)

16 Courts uniformly deal with the interrelation between the federal statute and
17 the contract cause of action by finding that the "terms of a job clearance order
18 which reflect DOL requirements become a part of the employment contract as a
19 matter of law." (emphasis added) *Frederick County*, 703 F.Supp. at 1031, citing
20 *Salazar-Calderon*, 765 F.2d at 1342 (5th Cir.1985). Courts, including the Ninth
21

1 Circuit, find that H-2A contracts are enforceable under state contract law, and that
2 the existence of federal statutory enforcement mechanisms does not preempt the
3 state contract law remedy. *See Nieto-Santos*, 743 F.2d 638 at 641; *Arriaga*, 305
4 F.3d 1235 – 1237. (*See also Avery v. City of Talladega*, 24 F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th
5 Cir.1994) (FLSA does not preempt state contract claims)).

6 This rule aligns with the Supreme Court's holding that a contract that
7 incorporates federal statutory language does not necessarily create a federal cause
8 of action; but it does leave such a contract enforceable under state contract law.
9 *Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division* 1285, 457 U.S. 15, 23 - 28 (1982).². In
10 *Nieto-Santos*, the Ninth Circuit applied *Jackson Transit* to state law claims arising
11 out breach of H-2A contracts. *Id.*, at 641.

12 iii. Defendants offer no authority to contradict the settled rule that
13 workers may enforce H-2A contracts which incorporate terms
required under federal regulations

14 Defendants confusingly refer to 8 U.S.C. §1329 (Ct. Rec. 28 at 7) to argue
15 that only the DOL, and not workers, can enforce H-2A contracts. But § 1329 does
16 not preclude a private individual from litigating in federal court, so long as another
17 basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is present (e.g. §1331 and §1337). Nor
18 does defendants' reference to *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee*, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) support any argument relevant to this case. *Reno*

20 ² *Jackson* also said that the state-law contract claims could be brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction,
21 457 U.S. at 28 n.11, which is the jurisdictional posture of this case.

1 considered a jurisdictional provision of the INA – 8 U.S.C. §1252(g) – and
2 interpreted that provision to mean that immigrants could not sue the Attorney
3 General for three narrow actions: commencing, adjudicating, and executing
4 removals. *Reno* at 482. The instant case does not have to do with immigration
5 proceedings and is not an action against the Attorney General. *Reno* and §1329
6 thus lack any relevance to this case.³

7 iv. Defendants' *Cort v. Ash* argument is inapposite, since plaintiffs
8 have not alleged a private right of action under the H-2A statute

9 Defendants' assertion that under *Cort v. Ash* plaintiffs lack a private right of
10 action to enforce the H-2A statute is inapplicable to this case. (Ct. Rec. 28, 8 – 13).
11 Plaintiffs assert breach of contract claims under state law, not a private right of
12 action to enforce the H-2A statute.

13 III. CONCLUSION

14 This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs' claims both
15 pursuant to §1331 because of their federal claims under TVPRA and FLSA, and
16 pursuant to § 1337 supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because these
17 claims are part of the same case or controversy and stem from a common nucleus
18 of facts. Defendants' assertions that Congress meant to preclude state-law contract
19 claims for H-2A contract violations has no basis in any authority and contradicts

20 ³ *Reno* itself emphasized that its holding was limited to three types of INA claims, and rejected the notion that in
enacting IIRIRA Congress had “impose[d] a general jurisdictional limitation” on the federal courts. *Reno* at 482.

1 precedent binding on this court. For those reasons, defendants' Rule 12(b)(1)
2 motions to dismiss plaintiffs' state-law claims for lack of subject-matter
3 jurisdiction should be DENIED.

4 DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.

5 Respectfully submitted,

6 NORTHWEST JUSTICE PROJECT

7 By /s/ Michele Besso

Michele Besso, WSBA #17423

9 FARMWORKER JUSTICE

10 By: /s/ Weeun Wang

Weeun Wang

11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2

3 I hereby certify that on November 8, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing
4 with the Clerk of the Court using CM/EFC System which will send notification of
such filing to the following:

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